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ACCIDENT REDUCTION THROUGH
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Abstract
The advent of technology has aided pilots navigate challenging terrain and avoid potentially disastrous
weather systems, but the large mounts of information required to process have significantly hindered crews, some
to overwhelming proportions with catastrophic results. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a skill set utilized by
crews to recognize, avoid, and mitigate risk. This report discusses some of the factors facing crews in today's flight
environment and looks at some recent accidents that were attributed to CRM failures. Also, we'll analyze
recommended changes to the traditional CRM concept and how they are being incorporated in commercial and general
aviation. I'll also discuss the technological upgrades and the pilfdk associated with the advancement of avionics and
computerized flight control.
United Airlines Flight 173 was on final approach
to Portland International Airport after an uneventful flight
on December 28, 1978. The pilot noticed that he had not
received the proper indication that the landing gear was
down and locked into position. The nose gear light failed to
illuminate green, the safe indication. The aircrew notified
the air traffic control center and requested additional flight
time to resolve the situation. The crew initiated the
appropriate checklists while circling near the airfield. In
spite of the crew's efforts, the nose gear landing light
continued to glow red, still indicating the gear was not
locked into position. Throughout the troubleshooting
process the first officer and flight engineer informed the
pilot that the plane was running low on fuel. The pilot either
ignored the warnings or did not comprehend the messages.
Approximately six miles southeastof the airport the aircraft
crashed into a wooded residential neighborhood. This was
the result of the engines being completely starved of fuel.
Eight passengers and two crew members were killed, and 23
people were seriously injured. Since there was no fuel to
feed the fire,the death toll was relatively low for this type
of disaster. The lack of communication skills under stress,
situational awareness, team building, decision making and
task allocation were all contributingfactors in this accident.
The post crash analysis determined that the green light
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indicator for the nose landing gear had a burned-out bulb.
The nose gear had been down and locked the entire time.
(NTSB, aviation-safety.net, 2007)
Fast forward 28 years later.
On August 27, 2006, about 6:06 am. eastern
daylight time, Cornair flight 5191, a Bombardier CL-6002B19, crashed during takeoff fiom Blue Grass Airport,
Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take
off h m runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on
nmway 26 and began the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off
the end of the runway and impacted the airport perimeter
fence, trees, and terrain. The captain, flight attendant, and 47
passengerswere killed, and the first officer received serious
injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and
post crash fire. The National Transportation Safety Board
determined that the probable cause of this accident was the
flight crew members' failure to use available cues and aids
to iden@ the airplane's location on the airport surface
during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that
the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff.
Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's nonpertinent c o n v d o n s during taxi, which resulted in a loss
of positional awareness. (NTSB, 2006)
Flight 173's disaster was the catalyst for the
aviation industry's recognition that technology alone was
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not the cause of air mishaps. An evolution in how crews
interacted in flight has begun. The DC-8 used by Flight 173
was a fully functional, mechanically sound air&ame that
crashed because the humans flying the machine channelized
their attention towards a burned-out light bulb. The pilot
became so absorbed in the burned-out bulb that he forgot to
fly the plane. As a result of this mishap and many similar
ones, a new training program was implemented that sought
to capture and minimize human iiailty. Cockpit Resource
Management (CRM) had been what researchers thought at
the time a solutionto break the human error chain. CRM has
been in place for over 30 years and is universally taught to
aircrews around the world. It is a process that is accepted
and has been attributed to significantly reducing aviation
accidents. In fact, the number of pilot error induced airline
mishaps declined between 1983 and 2002 decreased 40
percent. (Parsons, 2008)
Crew Resource Management
CRM is defined as the effective use of all resources
to minimize errors, improve safety and improve
performance. (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999) CRM
can be traced back to a 1979workshop sponsored by NASA
entitled Resource Management on the Flightdeck in
response to the number of air mishaps due to crew error.
The latest accident at the time had been United Airlines
Flight 173. The research presented at this meeting identified
the human error aspects of the majority of the air crashes as
failures of interpersonal communications,decisionmaking,
and leadership. It was at this meeting that the label CRM
was used. It was also at this meeting that many air carriers
became committedto develop training programs to enhance
the interpersonal aspects of flight operations.
CRM evolved significantly since United Airlines
initiated the first comprehensiveU.S. program in 1981. The
first iterationsof CockpitResource Management focused on
changing individual styles and correcting deficiencies in
individual behavior such as lack of assertiveness in junior
crewmembers and authoritarian behavior in senior pilots.
These programs initially encountered resistance h m some
pilots, who denounced them as "charm school" or attempts
to manipulate their personalities. (Helmreich, Merritt, &
Wilhelm, 1996)
CRM training later became a process that required
human factors be addressed in each aspect of flight training.
As part of the latest generation of CRM, several airlines
have made particular concepts into procedure to ensure
proper decisions and actions are performed based on CRM
considerations. CRM training is now more accepted across
the aviation industry and a standard in training programs

throughout civilian and military flight training as well as
other careers including medical, fire fighting, and others that
require risk analysis.
Still, research suggests that 80% of all aviation
accidents continue to be the result of some form of human
error. Development of new technology such as Synthetic
Vision Systems(SVS) that allow a GPS overlay view of the
terrain are direct results of these accidents and are designed
to prevent, intervene, andlor mitigate pilot error. These new
technologies require a modification to the original CRM
model to allow for the added information and capabilities.
Barrien to Effective CRM
CRM is a process that allows crews to overcome
challenges to day to day operations as well as effectively
handle unforeseen situations. Barriers to effective CRM
minimh the crews' ability to handle an event in a safe and
timely manner. Barriers are any factors that inhibit
communication,situational awareness, decisionmaking and
teamwork. Barriers can be external (physical) or internal
(prejudice, opinions, attitudes, stress). Once these barriers
are identified, crew can then properly apply appropriate
skills to mitigate those barriers. The difficulty lies in
identhe barriers, especially internal. While the
following examples are not all inclusive, they address some
of the common barriers crews face.
External Barriers
External barriers include the physical forces
surrounding a crew in their mission. Some examples
include:
Weather
Air Traffic Control

Aircraftsystems
Location (familiar vs. non-familiar)
A relativelynew external barrier that must be addressed
is the congestion of the National Air Space (NAS). With the
influx of aircraft and degraded performance of Air Traffic
Control (ATC) equipment, airspace is at a premium,
especially in the highly populated areas of the U.S. and
around the world. This creates challengesthat aircrewsmust
face on a daily basis. It is well known that the current air
tramportation system does not meet the growing needs of
the 21* century. The ability of the NAS to meet future
demands is constrained by the limited capacity caused by
the traditional hub-and-spoke method currently utilized by
air carriers. This bottle-neck has also led to a large number
of corporately and privately owned air& to infiltrate the
airways finther causing the congestion. (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2004)
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The one thing that these external barriers have in
common is that they can be observed and analyzed by all
pertinent crewmembers, whereas internal barriers cannot
and it is incumbent upon the individualto addressthe barrier
and properly communicate histher concerns or agendas to
the other crewmembers.
Internal Barriers
Internal barriers are difficult to identi@ and
analyze. Each human being is created differently and has
different forces acting on their lives at any given time. These
are the issues that don't readily appear until a chain of
events force the crewmember to react in a way that reflects
hisher mental state or capabilities. (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2004) Some typical internal barriers
include:
StresslFatigue
o Anxiety
o Frustration
o Fear
o Anger
Task Overload I Underload (compliancy)
Group Mindset
"Press on Regardless" Philosophy
Insufficient Communication
Hazardous Attitudes
Although CRM is a widely accepted program, there
is a small subset of pilots that reject the concept. These
individuals can be found in every flying environment and
are known to their peers and leadership. Efforts at remedial
training for these pilots have proved ineffective. It's
incumbentupon senior leadershipthat these individuals not
be put in a situation that their attitudes/personalities
jeopardize the safety of others or be influential on junior
crewmembers. (Helmreich & Butler, 1991)
Is it Human Error?
Currently there is a trend towards the notion that a
single causal failure is an inadequate explanation in failure
generation. (Reason, 1997) The incidence of failure
attributedto human causes has risen h m an estimated 20%
in the 1960s to some 80% in the 1990s. (Hollnagel, 1993)
Could the advent of CRM be the cause of this attribution?
Is it simply easier for investigatorsto say that the pilot made
an error or the crew made a series of errors that led to a
mishap? This increase is believed to be a reflection of the
increasing complexityof technical systems and the resulting
inability of humans involved in all stages of design,
manufacturing, and operations to exercise control over the
system. In almost all accidents, the failure events cannot be
attributed to a single root cause, but rather the result of the
JAAER, Winter 2011
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complex interaction that occurs between the elements. This
complexityrequires the crews to be able to deal with a range
of nondesign emergencies which lie outside of the known
Mure envelope designated by the engineers. (Reason,
1990) While contingency plans may be available for many
events, there will always be the unforeseen through the
system which was either not considered, or possibly even
dismissed, by designers as being so improbable as to be
impossible. (Perrow, 1984) Thus, a full analysis of the
causal factors cannot be truly accurate.
Train as you Fight, Fight as you Train
The initial introduction of CRM focused on the
personalities and attitudes of the crew members and did not
necessarily combine the crews in a scenario that would test
and evaluatetheir "CRM" skills. Further enhancement ofthe
program instituted simulators that focused on the crew
interactions during normal operations and then presented
them with one or multiple distracters (poor weather,
mechanical malfimction, unruly passenger, etc). This gave
the crewmembers the opportunity to apply their skills in a
safe environment and to review their actions after the
simulator was complete, since most events were video
recorded for playback. The results h m these simulator
events eventually began to migrate to the aircraft.
When crews are placed under stress during actual
situations, many have said that it was at that point that their
training went into effect. So without proper &aining, how
can someone be in a position to let the training take effect
and handle an emergency appropriately? It is imperative
that crewmembers be given the proper training and the
opportunity to put into practice the concepts learned in a
classroom environment.
General Aviation Resource Management
Although the commercial aviation indushy is
continually highlighted when an air carrier crashes, the
number of small general aviation (GA) aircraft accidents fhr
exceed the commercialaccident..GA accidentsalso account
for a much larger number of people injured or killed. GA
accidents can be attributed to several factors, but the most
common hctors to emerge hmresearch conductedinto GA
accidents and incidents, are those of poor judgment and
decision making. The single-pilot operations in GA are
arguably one of the most demanding civil aviation tasks.
Traditional GA training does not incorporate the
CRM skills, but rather the technical aspects of fight and an
individual's skills to manipulate the aircraft in a safe
manner.Those skillsconcentratedon by the use of CRM are
just now being utilized in small a i d and single pilot
operations. A research panel concluded that providing a
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CRM based training to singlepilots would improve their
decision making processes, leading to an overall reduction
in the rate of accidentsand incidents, and to an improvement
in the efficiency of flight operations. This finding was
consistent with a study by Alan Diehl which found that
judgment training can lead to a significant reduction in
aircrew error. (Diehl, 1990)
There is a push to require GA pilots to attend some
form of CRM training tailored to meet the demands of
single-pilot operations. One concern of this is that there is
the likelihood that the training will only be a "check in the
box" and not truly meet the needs to trainthe pilots properly
enough to be effective. However, if the program is
developed in a manner as to require some form of
observable evaluation, surely there will be an efkdive tool
in reducing the large number of GA accidents.
Technology and CRM
Shortly after the dawn of manned flight, aviators
began to acknowledge the limitations of flight based on
weather conditions.Instrumentationand ground-basedradio
navigation aids were developed to assist and eventually
replace out the window information during IMC. An
example of one such aid is the Instrument Landing System
(ILS). The ILS consists of two radio beams that present both
lateral and vertical course guidance information. The goal of
the pilot flying the ILS is to keep the aircraft centered on
this course until decision height (DH), a predetermined
height above the ground.
To assist the pilot in flying the ILS, a flight director
system was later developed to calculate a course that allows
the aircraft to intercept and fly the ILS signal down to DH.
The change in roll and pitch calculatedby the flight director
is then presented to the pilot by pitch and roll bars on the
attitude indicator. The flight director provides improved
course guidance, but is not intuitive and provides very little
real time situational awareness.
The next large breakthrough was the incorporation
of a Heads Up Display (HUD). The HUD allowed a level of
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integration not before possible by superimposing flight
symbology on either a panel- or head-mounted display.
Instead of using the panel-mounted AD1 for attitude
indication, the HUD allows presentation of attitude
information with an artificial horizon which is conformal
with the outside scene, with additional information
immediately available on one display. The HUD also
pments the K i t path idbrmation (the actual direction of
the aircraft vs. orientation of the aircraft), allowing for a
more intuitive method of control. With this flight path
display, the pilot can determine required trajectory needed
to intercept desired course (Foyle, Ahumada, Larimer, &
Sweet, 1992).
Currently, with GPS navigation and approaches becoming
the norm in aviation, the integration of moving maps and
overlay approaches provide the aircrew with a top down
view of the surrounding area, normally displayed on
either a stand-alone GPS or via a multi-function display
(MFD). This provides improved situational awareness
based on the aircraft's position over the ground, but does
not provide pertinent real-time information in relation to
the aircraft's attitude or current trajectory.
Synthetic Vision Systems
Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) are aimaft
technologies that depict computer generated displays of
terrain surrounding an aircraft in order to provide a visual
solution
instrumentmeteorologicalconditions(IMC)
to prevent incidents such as controlled flight into temin or
loss of situational awareness. Improved pilot situational
awareness (SA) during low visibility conditions is
potentially offered by SVS displays because of the natural
cues oEmd by a 3D perspective of the outside world
showing unlimited ceiling and visibility conditions. New
technological developmentsinnavigation performance, lowcost attitude and heading r e h c e systems, computational
capabilities, and display hardware allow for the prospect of
SVS displays for virtually all aircraft classes.
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A fundamenrally new approach is needed to Sully
integrate the human-machine interface. While it is unlikely
that conventional display concepts can significantly increase
safety as new technology cannot simply be laye~edonto
previous concepts since the current system coniplexitier ate
already toet high (Thetinissen, 1997). One such apprtjach
applies the f u n h e n t a l advantage of perspective fli&tpath
displays relative to cttnventionaf displays. Rather then
directingthe pilot what to do, SVS navigational displays can
now provide infomgnation about the margins within which the
pilot is allowed to operate. 'lbese additional display
clemen~sprovide guidance thal does not force the pilot to
apply a continuous compenmtory control strategy.
Only in this way can human flexibility be
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Conclusion
Uncertainties, intrusions, and general distractions
all pose a significant threat to the safe operation of an
air&. Fortunately there are concepts developedtoprovide
checks and balances to establish and maintain safe
operations. Pilot induced mishaps do still occur, but at a far
lower rate than during the period prior to the inception of
CRM. Is any rate other than zero an acceptable number?
No, but crews now are more equipped with the tools to
make sound decisions based on conditions and personal
experience. What can never be fully understood is the total
number of aircraft and lives that have been saved because of
the implementation of CRM. There are many examples of
crews working diligently to get a crippled aircrafl safely on
the ground. Most recently, the crew of US Airways Flight
1549 safely ditched an Airbus A320 into the Hudson River
after losing all thrust in both engines. The pilot had been
instrumental in the integration of CRM at the airline, and
fully believes the concepts and skills learned aided their
ability to safely land the airplane.

The crew members of the flights at the beginning
of .this report were experiencing two different situations.
One crew focused their attention on troubleshooting an
emergency they thought could have serious consequences;
the other crew, complacent, failed to use available resources
to verify their location prior to departure.Another difference
is that the second crew had been trained to use CRM to
become more acute@ aware of their surround'lngs,
unfortunately they failed to maintain a sharp awareness.
However, both met similar fates. For CRM to be successful,
it must be incorporated all the time, every time. The skills
and concepts must not be watered down or allowed to decay
over time. Management must support it and those that
evaluate the process must enforce its practice. General
aviatom need to fully comprehend the CRM process. New
technologies such as SVS need to be readily available to
both commercial and civilian aviation. We as human beings
will continue to make mistakes, but by utilizing the concepts
and practices of CRM and ensuring they are adhered to
during all phases of aircraft operations; we can see a decline
in aviation mishaps and prevent further accidents..)
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